Liquidity spillover effects of equity offerings over dual-class shares by Vasco, Mateo & Agudelo, Diego A.
No. 14-27 
2014 
 
Liquidity spillover effects of equity offerings 
over dual-class shares 
Vasco, Mateo; Agudelo, Diego A. 
  
Liquidity spillover effects of equity offerings 
over dual-class shares1 
Mateo Vasco2 Diego A. Agudelo 
July, 2014 
 
Abstract 
We study the spillover effect from equity offerings over dual-class shares. Whereas, evidence 
has been found that a seasoned equity offering improves stock liquidity, the effect over the 
liquidity of different type shares of the same firm has not been explored. We use equity offer-
ings of five Latin American countries: Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru, during 1995 
to 2012, because dual-class shares are widely used in the regions. In spite of the expected 
information asymmetry reduction, using panel data models we found a stock liquidity reduc-
tion of dual-class shares upon the offering; consistent with trading migration effects, according 
with the theory of inventory costs.  
JEL Classification: G12, G14, G15. 
Keywords: Stock liquidity; Equity offerings; Event studies; Emerging markets. 
1. Introduction 
As alternative shares of a given firm equity, dual-class shares typically have closely related cash-
flows, are exposed to similar market and idiosyncratic effects and compete for a very similar pool of 
investors. Thus, dual class stocks offer a natural control sample to test for differential effects, associ-
ated to property rights, trading, liquidity such as in Ang, Chua & Jiang (2010), Levy (1983), Ødegaard 
(2007), Smith & Amoako-Adu (1995), among others. 
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Despite the worldwide use of dual-class shares, they have had different features across countries. In 
some countries they are banned, in other they are allowed but not listed, and in a few countries they 
are more similar to debt-like security. For example, in China, dual-class B shares allow foreign in-
vestors to participate in the stock market and buy a limited stake in Chinese companies.3 Meanwhile, 
in Latin America dual-class shares have been issued with similar cash-flows but limited political 
rights, to keep corporate control of traditional blockholders (Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Masulis, Pham, 
& Zein, 2011). 
In this paper we study the effect of dual-class share offerings on the liquidity of a different type 
of share of the same issuer (henceforth called “associated dual-class share”). This relationship be-
tween equity offerings and dual-class stock liquidity has not been studied, to the extent of our 
knowledge. 
The closest related literature study effects of seasoned equity offerings on liquidity and returns 
of the same security. Lease, Masulis & Page (1991) find a buy-sell imbalance associated to an increase 
in trading volume and a decrease in bid-ask spreads, during SEOs in NYSE and AMEX. Similarly, 
Tripathy & Rao (1992) find a significant decrease in bid-ask spreads after the offering date. They 
argue that this is due to a decrease of adverse selection costs because of the increased information 
gathered during the underwriting. Kothare (1997) also provides evidence of decreasing bid-ask 
spreads after SEOs in NASDAQ. She argues that this liquidity gain comes from reducing ownership 
concentration which decreases adverse selection costs that dealers assume for the probability of trad-
ing with informed investors. Eckbo, Masulis & Norli (2000) also present evidence of a liquidity im-
provement after a SEO, but using turnover as proxy of liquidity instead of the liquidity measures 
widely accepted. 
Providing an alternative explanations for post-SEO higher liquidity, Bilinski, Lui & Strong 
(2012) show that the number of analysts following the firm increases significantly after the event, 
which can also mitigate adverse selections costs. Additionally, they show an increase in participation 
of institutional investors, both in number and ownership share, which is also a source of liquidity 
improvement, given that institutional investors are usually deemed to be non-informed liquidity in-
vestors that frequently rebalance their portfolio (Rubin, 2007). Reduction of information asymmetry 
upon a SEO is measured by Brooks & Patel (2000) for NYSE and AMEX, and Kryzanowski, Lazrak 
& Rakita (2010) for TSX, who find a drop in the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread. 
Unlike these previous studies, we are not interested in the effect of a SEO over the liquidity of 
the issued share, but the effect that an equity offering (either SEO or IPO) has on other stocks of the 
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same issuer. This is particularly important to be studied in Latin American markets because of the 
wide use of dual-class shares. Dual-class shares have been extensively used in the region by control-
ling shareholders as a mechanism to raise capital while keeping control of the firm. Additionally, if 
one of the reasons to issue new equity is to reduce the cost of capital by making the company more 
visible and its share more liquid (Amihud & Mendelson, 1986a, 1986b, 1988), managers should take 
into account the effect of new equity offerings on liquidity of other securities. 
There are at least two expected and opposite liquidity spillover effects of equity offerings to the 
associated dual-class share. Firstly, the inventory costs theory of liquidity relate trading activity with 
liquidity (Amihud & Mendelson, 1980; Grossman & Miller, 1988; Ho & Stoll, 1981, 1983). As the 
only considerable distinction between most of the different classes of shares in Latin America are 
vote rights (Doidge, 2004; Dyck & Zingales, 2004; Nenova, 2001, 2003), we could expect that some 
minority institutional investors and noise traders replace the associated dual-class share with the re-
cent issued share, reducing the frequency in which the latter is traded and, consequently, decreasing 
its liquidity.4 Secondly, from the evidence on the effects of SEOs mentioned above, the increased 
visibility associated with an equity offering and information revealed during the underwriting process, 
should also benefit the associated dual class share, with the consequent reduction in adverse selection 
cost and increase on liquidity.5 
For this purpose, we run a panel-data model in event time to estimate the effect of an equity 
offering on the liquidity of associated dual-class shares, controlling for other well-known determi-
nants of liquidity. We identify all equity offerings of Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru during 
1995 to 2012 of dual class-shares, and include a set of control samples, following a matching proce-
dure. 
The results supports the idea that an equity offering reduces liquidity of associated dual-class 
shares, suggesting that some investors migrate from the associated dual class share to the recently 
issued, and that this effect dominates any possible reduction in adverse selection costs due to new 
information revealed or higher visibility. This liquidity impairment is evidenced on two out of three 
liquidity proxies. The results are robust to different estimation methods. 
The contribution of this paper to the literature is four-fold. First, this is the first research to study 
the liquidity impact of equity offerings on dual-class shares. Whereas it is well known that seasoned 
equity offerings improves liquidity of the issued shares, what happens with the other shares of the 
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same issuer had not been explored. Second, unlike the SEO literature mentioned above, we are able 
to include initial public offerings in our events, as we are interested in analyzing the behavior of 
shares different from the issued one. Third, this is one of the few existing studies that use an event 
study to analyze the change in stock liquidity. Moreover, we use a multivariate regression approach 
instead of the most common univariate analysis to draw more robust conclusions. Finally, studying 
the liquidity of Latin American dual class-shares is not only relevant because of the wide use of dual-
class shares in the region, but also because lack of liquidity is a well-known barrier for the develop-
ment of emerging markets. The detriment of liquidity of associated dual-class shares should be fac-
tored in the corporate decision of raising capital by equity issuing. 
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the source of data, the computation of 
liquidity proxies and the empirical event design. In section 3 we present the econometric results. 
Section 4 concludes. 
2. Data and methodology 
The data on prices, quotes and volumes were collected on a stock daily basis from Datastream, be-
ginning in January 1995 and ending December 2012 of all listed shares in the stock exchanges of 
Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Mexico and Peru.6 To mitigate the survivorship bias, we include current 
dead shares that used to be active in some period of time of the sample. This data will allow us to 
calculate various liquidity proxies and some control variables. 
We compute log returns on daily basis with closing prices and the proportional bid-ask spread 
with quoted bid and ask prices. The bid-ask spread is one of our proxies of liquidity. The other two 
are: Amihud’s impact price (Amihud, 2002) and Zero daily returns (Lesmond, Ogden, & Trzcinka, 
1999) which has already been tested as a good transaction costs proxy in emerging markets (Bekaert, 
Harvey, & Lundblad, 2007; Lee, 2011). Bid-ask spread is calculated as in equation (1); we discarded 
bid-ask spreads greater than 0.8 (similar to Lesmond, 2005) and then averaged across each month for 
each stock. 
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The Amihud’s impact price measure was computed as in equation (2) in daily basis, winsorized 
at percentiles 1 and 99 and then averaged across each month. 
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The Zero daily return measure was computed as the percentage of days within each month with 
zero return and positive volume, following Goyenko, Holden & Trzcinka (2009). 
Data of equity offerings comes from Bloomberg, and was matched with the database of prices, 
quotations and volume using the Sedol code.7 Table 1 presents the number of shares, equity offerings 
and equity offering of dual-class firms. The number of shares includes currently active and dead 
shares. Naturally, the biggest sample belongs to Brazil. The countries with higher proportion of dual-
class offerings are Colombia and Mexico. 
Table 1: Sample size per country 
Country Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru Total 
Number of shares 1,100 315 187 335 316 2,253 
Number of equity offerings 1,108 262 45 254 103 1,772 
Number of equity offerings of dual-class firms 72 7 6 25 3 113 
 
For each equity offering we selected a share of a different firm using a matching procedure to 
control for systematic factors that could affect liquidity of similar stocks.8 Specifically, we set up the 
following industry-size matching algorithm: 
1. Start from a given stock issued in a given date (event). 
2. Select stocks of the same industry at GICS 3 digit-level. 
3. Exclude stocks of the same issuer. 
4. Keep stocks that have been traded, at least, 30% of trading days of prior month of the event. 
5. Select the stock closest in size to the issued stock, as given by the log difference of market 
caps. 
6. In case that two or more stocks meet the above conditions, we select the stock higher average 
trading volume in the last month. 
7. If no stock fulfills these conditions, the procedure is repeated from step 2 with a GICS 2 digit-
level matching. 
Table 2 presents summary statistics of our three liquidity measures by country. The liquidity 
measures are strongly positively skewed, especially Amihud’s measure and bid-ask spread. The most 
liquid market is the Chilean one: it has the lowest Ahmihud’s impact prices, the narrowest spreads 
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and the lowest percentage of days with zeros returns. In fact, this quoted spread of Chilean market is 
similar to effective spread of NASDAQ, Spain and Australia stock exchanges, as Brockman, Chung 
& Pérignon (2009) reported; but spreads of Brazil, Mexico and Peru are much higher than developed 
countries.9 
Table 2: Summary statistics of liquidity measures per country 
 Brazil Chile Colombia Mexico Peru 
      
Amihud      
Min 0 0 0 0 0.0000133 
Max 1.327823 0.0096467 0.0027578 0.1022167 0.0290234 
Mean 0.0095319 0.0002147 0.0002812 0.0017601 0.0011391 
Percentile 25 0.0000007 0.0000003 0.0000004 0.0000007 0.0000926 
Percentile 50 0.0000853 0.0000108 0.0000237 0.0000675 0.000194 
Percentile 75 0.0018117 0.0001194 0.0001807 0.0005504 0.0004323 
      
Bid-ask spread      
Min 0.0011606 0.0022553  0.0015234 0.0048532 
Max 0.7256513 0.12517  0.2534381 0.0738293 
Mean 0.0600401 0.0107377  0.0281716 0.0218853 
Percentile 25 0.0085592 0.0047681  0.0072613 0.0123463 
Percentile 50 0.0236118 0.0065479  0.016277 0.0179648 
Percentile 75 0.0720114 0.0089742  0.0364458 0.0284121 
      
Zeros      
Min 0 0 0 0 0 
Max 0.7368421 0.5909091 0.3636364 0.85 0.4347826 
Mean 0.0755761 0.053473 0.0922521 0.0532169 0.1868215 
Percentile 25 0 0 0 0 0.05 
Percentile 50 0.0434783 0 0.0909091 0 0.1904762 
Percentile 75 0.1 0.05 0.1428571 0.0869565 0.2857143 
 
We run a panel-data econometric model in event time. The event is defined as the moment in 
which an equity offering occurs (IPO or SEO) in a firm with at least one associated dual-class share. 
The pre-event window is 12 months prior, and the post-event window is 12 months after the equity 
offering. If i is the analyzed stock (either the associated dual-class or the control share), the econo-
metric model for the event study is as follows: 
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where 12, 11, , 0, ,11,12t     months and 0t   identifies the event date; itIlliquidity  is, alter-
natively, the Amihud’s measure in logs, the bid-ask spread in logs10 and the Zero daily return;11 
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tAfter offering  is a dummy variable that take the value of zero before the event date and the value of 
1 after the event date; iDual  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for the associated dual-
class share and zero otherwise; iControl  is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 for matched 
control share and zero otherwise; and 
'
itx  is a vector of control variables. 
If an equity offering cause a negative impact over the associated dual-class share, we expect a 
positive sign of   coefficient. Also, as the matched share is not likely to be affected by the equity 
offering, we expect   to be not statistically significant. Following the literature (Chung, Elder, & 
Kim, 2010; Grullon, Kanatas, & Weston, 2004; Kryzanowski et al., 2010; Rhee & Wang, 2009; 
Sankaraguruswamy, Shen, & Yamada, 2013), we use the following stock-month control variables: 
volume traded (in logs), for which we expect a negative sign (higher liquidity); volatility, which 
should have a positive sign; return, which should have a negative sign; and price (in logs) which we 
expect to have a negative sign. 
3. Results 
Table 3 presents the main results of the regression analysis of the model. As can be seen in columns 
1 and 3, illiquidity of dual-class shares rises after an equity offering of the same issuer: both coeffi-
cients are positive and highly significant, which means that impact price and the percentage of days 
with zero return increase. However, it cannot be proven using bid-ask spread as liquidity proxy. On 
the other hand, matched shares liquidity do not seem to be affected by the equity offering, as expected; 
the coefficients are not statistically significant, except of Zeros measure, but only at 10% significance 
level. 
Most of the rest of coefficient signs are as expected. The higher volume, the less illiquid shares 
are, except with Zeros measure. Volatility increases illiquidity, but with Zeros measure it shows the 
opposite sign. This could be explained as an estimation bias, because when Zeros are high, there are 
no enough data to properly calculate the standard deviation of the returns. The sign and significance 
of return coefficient are as expected only for bid-ask spread: when returns are positive (negative), 
illiquidity reduces (increases). Finally, the sign and significance of price coefficient are as expected 
only for Zeros measure. 
The panel-data was estimated with individual fixed effects. A joint-test of country fixed effects 
did not showed to be significant. We also tested the significance of differential effect of the event 
over stock liquidity, using interaction of country dummies with t iAfter offering Dual , but it also 
proved to be insignificant. 
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Table 3: Panel-data regressions of event studies around equity offerings and their impact on dual-class shares' liquidity 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. variable ln (Amihud) ln (BA Spread) Zeros 
    
After offeringt × Duali 0.0055*** −0.0015 0.0280*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.006) 
    
After offeringt × Controli 0.0003 0.0021 −0.0089* 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0043) 
    
ln Volumeit −0.0050*** −0.0084*** −0.0014 
 (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0018) 
    
Volatilityit 0.0134*** 0.0141*** −0.0776*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0019) (0.0063) 
    
Returnit −0.006 −0.0098** 0.0265* 
 (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0126) 
    
ln Priceit −0.0017 0.0015 −0.0224** 
 (0.0023) (0.0025) (0.0085) 
    
N 2764 2324 2764 
R2 0.0653 0.1257 0.0851 
Log likelihood 6533.3946 5440.4484 2969.4796 
The table reports estimates from panel-data regressions of dual-class shares liquidity as an event study around the equity 
offering of a share of the same issuer. The frequency is monthly and the event window starts 12 months before the event 
and ends 12 months after the event. Liquidity is measured by the log of monthly average Amihud’s impact price measure 
(column 1), the log of monthly quoted bid-ask spread (column 2) and the monthly Zero daily returns (column 3). After 
offeringt is a dummy variable that take the value of zero before the event date and the value of 1 after the event date. Duali 
is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the analyzed share is the dual-class associated to the event and zero otherwise. 
Controli is a dummy variable that takes the value of 1 if the analyzed share is the matched control share associated to the 
event and zero otherwise. Volumeit is the total money traded of the share during the month. Volatilityit is de sample standard 
deviation of daily log return during the month. Returnit is the monthly log return of the share. ln Priceit is the log of the last 
price of the month. The panel data was estimated with fixed effects. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. 
The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Additionally, to take into account the possible endogenous relation between liquidity and trading 
volume, we also estimated the model using the first lag of the latter as instrumental variable. The 
results are presented in Table 4. This kind of estimation could be accomplished because of the absence 
of autocorrelation proved through a Wooldridge test. The results do not differ from previous estima-
tion; there are only some changes in control variables coefficients significance. 
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Table 4: Panel-data regressions of event studies around equity offerings and their impact on dual-class shares' liquidity 
using instrumental variables 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. variable ln (Amihud) ln (BA Spread) Zeros 
    
After offeringt × Duali 0.0055* −0.0013 0.0243*** 
 (0.0027) (0.0025) (0.0067) 
    
After offeringt × Controli 0.0006 0.0025 −0.0093* 
 (0.0005) (0.0014) (0.004) 
    
ln Volumeit −0.0056** −0.0139*** −0.0013 
 (0.0018) (0.0033) (0.0053) 
    
Volatilityit 0.0138** 0.0171*** −0.0792*** 
 (0.0051) (0.0039) (0.0089) 
    
Returnit −0.0057 −0.0075 0.022 
 (0.0059) (0.0043) (0.0142) 
    
ln Priceit −0.0018 0.0091* −0.0231* 
 (0.0024) (0.0039) (0.0102) 
    
N 2532 2141 2532 
R2 0.0587 0.0885 0.0826 
Log likelihood 5948.0115 4978.5695 2732.8015 
The table reports estimates from panel-data regressions of dual-class shares liquidity as an event study around the equity 
offering of a share of the same issuer. The frequency is monthly and the event window starts 12 months before the event 
and ends 12 months after the event. Variables description are the same as in Table 4. The panel data was estimated with 
fixed effects, using the first lag of Volumeit as instrumental variable through two-stage least-squares. Robust standard errors 
are presented in parenthesis. The symbols ***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
Finally, we also estimated the panel-data using a Tobit model, considering that all of three liquid-
ity measures are censored by definition. As can be seen in equation (2), the minimum value that Ami-
hud’s impact price measure can be zero; thus, the minimum value of ln (1 + Amihud) is also zero. In 
the same way, as can be seen in equation (1), bid-ask spread is a percentage and, as a consequence, 
ln (1 + BA spread) is strictly between zero and ln (2). And Zero daily returns measure, as a percentage, 
is defined between zero and one. 
Results of Tobit estimation are presented in Table 5, rendering cualitatively the same result. To 
note the highly significant effect of equity offerings effect over dual-class shares using Amihud’s 
measure, and that the volume coefficient becomes significant using Zeros measure, in contrast with 
previous estimations. 
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Table 5: Panel-data regressions of event studies around equity offerings and their impact on dual-class shares' liquidity 
using Tobit estimation 
  (1) (2) (3) 
Dep. variable ln (Amihud) ln (BA Spread) Zeros 
    
After offeringt × Duali 0.0059*** 0.0004 0.0287*** 
 (0.0016) (0.0019) (0.0072) 
    
After offeringt × Controli 0.0005 0.0018 −0.0095 
 (0.0012) (0.0013) (0.0054) 
    
ln Volumeit −0.0047*** −0.0096*** −0.0053** 
 (0.0004) (0.0005) (0.0018) 
    
Volatilityit 0.0147*** 0.0170*** −0.0938*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0018) (0.0079) 
    
Returnit −0.0063 −0.0092* 0.0483** 
 (0.0035) (0.0038) (0.0161) 
    
ln Priceit −0.0025 0.0035* −0.0225*** 
 (0.0017) (0.0016) (0.0068) 
    
N 2764 2324 2764 
Log likelihood 6198.7168 5216.4142 1144.5291 
The table reports estimates from panel-data regressions of dual-class shares liquidity as an event study around the equity 
offering of a share of the same issuer. The frequency is monthly and the event window starts 12 months before the event 
and ends 12 months after the event. Variables description are the same as in Table 4. The panel data was estimated with 
Tobit estimation and random effects. Lower limit in column 1 is zero; lower and upper limits in column 2 are zero and ln 
(2); lower and upper limits in column 3 are zero and one. Robust standard errors are presented in parenthesis. The symbols 
***, ** and * denote significance at 1%, 5% and 10% level, respectively. 
4. Conclusions 
One of the main advantages to raise capital through issuing shares is the stock liquidity improvement, 
which finally benefits the cost of capital and the firm value. However, if the company is a dual-class 
firm, the final result might be more complicated. In this paper we provide evidence that after an equity 
offering, the liquidity of an associated dual-class share decreases, probably because of migration of 
traders from the associated dual-class shares to the just issued one. We use dual-class firms and equity 
offerings from five Latin American countries, a region with an intensive use of dual-class shares. This 
negative spillover effect should be taken into account by managers, when deciding to raise capital, 
and by investors because they could face unexpected trading costs. 
For future research, it could be interesting to extend this study to other countries. Also, analyze 
the effect of this liquidity spillover more in depth using the bid-ask spread decomposition, which 
require intraday data (George, 1991; Huang, 1997). 
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